

CHEGA!

Book 3 The right to make up your own mind



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2015

Chega!
Volume 3 – Direito à autodeterminação

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INTRODUCTION

Priscilla Hayner, March 2015

Timor-Leste, formerly known as East Timor, today represents the success of a movement for self-determination. We are able to watch with fascination as a new country takes root, matures, and takes its rightful place in carrying out international and national affairs.

However, this independence, finally fully achieved in 2002, came at a high price, after many decades of struggle against oppressive systems. Timor-Leste is a story that we can all learn from: its history includes colonial rule, resistance, internal conflict, occupation, further resistance, concentration camps and widespread death from famine. It finally had the opportunity to vote for its independence, but even this met a violent response from its former occupier.

The United Nations and others helped in the transition to statehood after the independence vote. Part of this effort was to help respond to the national desire for a full investigation into this history. The resulting truth commission of Timor-Leste, known as the CAVR (for its acronym in Portuguese), was an impressive body, and after several years of research and speaking with thousands of victims, it produced a stellar report. It stands out as a prominent example amongst the many truth commissions around the world to date.

This accessible, popular version of the report, in its five volumes, is one further step in setting a new standard for truth commissions. Like the full report, it is available in multiple languages. This English version should be especially useful for teachers and students in many parts of the world who can now more easily access this important story, with its universal relevance. It also provides a useful glimpse into how “truth commissions” undertake their work. This illustrated version should be useful to adults and adolescents, but could also be of interest to younger children. There are many parts of Timor-Leste history, for example, that show how war and conflict directly and negatively impact children and youth.

I commend the impressive efforts of those who have made this popular version of the CAVR report available, and hope this helps to reach the broader readership that the report deserves.

Priscilla Hayner is the author of *Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions*, and an independent expert on transitional justice, based in New York.



EDITOR'S NOTE TO TEACHERS

Welcome to this comic version of the Timor-Leste Chega! report.

The 5-part comic has been developed with East Timorese colleagues and the blessing of East Timorese leaders to make the full report available for practical use in the classroom, including being easily photocopyable! It is sincerely hoped that teachers of history, international relations, human rights, religious education and other subjects will find it useful. As it is also available in Indonesian (www.chegareport.net), teachers of Bahasa Indonesia might also find it a helpful language tool.

Why should schools and young people around the world study Chega?

Of the many reasons that could be given, I think the most important is the story of Timor-Leste itself. It is so improbable and amazing, it is guaranteed to excite and motivate young people.

The Timor story is also highly educational. It is informative in terms of events and players but, more deeply, in terms of the values it teaches. No-one could study Chega! without swearing off bullying, thinking twice about war and peace, and gaining a deeper insight into human nature and human rights and the latter's global importance in today's fractured, violent world.

Lastly, a word on the nature and use of the comic book.

Teachers should understand that Chega! is essentially a report on human rights violations committed on all sides in Timor-Leste over 24 years. It takes a particular, though fundamentally important, perspective. It is not a comprehensive academic treatise.

Teachers should also appreciate that as a human rights report, Chega! identifies perpetrators and victims and assigns guilt and that it does this regardless. The Indonesian military (not the Indonesian people) are prominent in this gallery of guilt but East Timorese and big name players in the UN, such as Australia, the US, UK and France, also qualified for this dis-honour board.

As a comic, the product also simplifies and presents its message in black and white. Teachers are strongly urged, therefore, to familiarise themselves with the full report and the compelling human stories it contains and to use it and the comic version hand in hand.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABRI	Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces)
Apodeti	Associação Popular Democrática Timorese (Timorese Popular Democratic Association)
ASDT	Associação Social Democrata Timorese (Timorese Social Democratic Association)
Asosiasaun HAK	Perkumpulan Hukum, Hak Asasi, dan Keadilan (Association for the Law, Human Rights and Justice)
CAVR	Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor-Leste (Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation)
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CNRT	Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorese (National Council for Timorese Resistance, established in 1998)
CPLP	Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (Community of Portuguese Speaking Nations)
CRC	International Convention on the Rights of the Child
CRP	Community Reconciliation Process
Fokupers	Forum Komunikasi Perempuan Timor Lorosa'e (East Timorese Women's Communication Forum)
Fretilin	Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (Revolutionary Front for Independent Timor-Leste)
GPK	Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan (Security Disturbers Movement)
Hansip	Pertahanan Sipil (Civilian Security)
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
KKP-HAM	Komisi Penyelidikan Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia (Commission for the Investigation of Human Rights Violations)
Kodim	Komando Distrik Militer (District Military Command)
Komnas HAM	Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (Indonesian National Human Rights Commission)
Kopassandha	Komando Pasukan Sandhi Yudha (Sandhi Yudha Special Forces)
Kopassus	Komando Pasukan Khusus (Kopassus/Special Forces)
Koramil	Komando Rayon Militer (Military Command at the Sub-district Level)
Korem	Komando Region Militer (Military Command at the Regional Level)
KOTA	Klibur Oan Timor Asuwain (The Association of Timorese Heroes)
KUHAP	Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana (Penal Process Code)
KUHP	Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana (Penal Code)

NGO	Non-Government Organisation
Pertamina	Perusahaan Tambang dan Minyak Indonesia (Indonesian Oil Company)
SGI	Satuan Gabungan Intelijen (Indonesian Intelligence Unit)
TBO	Tenaga Bantuan Operasi (Operations Assistant)
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesia National Defence Force)
	Tonsus Peleton Khusus (Special Platoon)
Trabalhista	Partido Trabalhista (Labour Party)
UDT	União Democrática Timorense (Timorese Democratic Union)
UN	United Nations
UNAMET	United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

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MAP OF TIMOR-LESTE





They arrive at the library.





Did the international community know that our land was ruled by another country?




Yes they knew! They knew that our country was colonised for hundreds of years, and that during that time Timorese did not have the right to determine their own destiny.

Why didn't they help us?






The Cold War was waged between capitalist America and its allies and the communist Soviet Union and its allies. Each side believed its system was superior and spent lots on its military. Their rivalry impacted on many countries.



The rivalry ended when there was reform in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union collapsed and split into several countries in 1991.






When the Cold War ended, the international community began taking note of human rights violations in Timor-Leste. We had an opportunity to determine our own destiny when international law was finally implemented.



What happened in Timor between 1974 and 1999 was influenced by international politics. After a long war and international campaign, our right to self-determination was exercised through a Popular Consultation in 1999.

THE HUMAN RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION

The right to self-determination was included in the United Nation's Charter in 1945. The right is also included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in Article 1 of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The UN states that this right must be upheld by all UN members.



This right includes three things:

A people's right to decide its political status.



A people's right to freely pursue its economic, social and cultural development.



A people's right to freely determine how to use its natural wealth and resources.



My children, when you are older you can work on that land over there and use it for growing food.



According to international law, self-determination must be exercised free of external intervention and threats, conducted impartially, and observed by the UN.

Children, let's sit down here. We will now take a look at Timor's diplomatic struggle for self-determination and the position taken by other countries on this issue.



THE UN'S POSITION ON THE TIMOR PROBLEM FROM 1975 TO 1999

At school we learnt that the UN's role is to maintain peace and cooperation in the world.

That's right! The UN was established in 1945 to guarantee peace and security in the world, and also to help countries work together for social development and human rights. Chapter XI of the UN Charter states that all members of the UN who still have responsibility for colonised territories must take steps to facilitate the process of self-determination for those colonies.



In 1960, the UN adopted a Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Then, in 1961, it established a Special Committee on Decolonisation to implement the declaration. During the 1960s, 42 countries gained independence, mostly in Africa.



Over here it says that on 15 December 1960 the UN General Assembly declared that the people of Portuguese Timor and other Portuguese colonies had the right to self-determination.


The Security Council



Oh hi, how are you?



OK. The most important UN body is the Security Council. This man can explain more.



The Security Council is the UN body with the most power. Its function is to guarantee peace and security between countries. It comprises 15 countries, five of whom are permanent members.

These are the five countries that won World War II. They are China, France, Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The other ten members are chosen by the General Assembly every two years.



What did the Security Council do for Timor-Leste?


The Security Council passed two resolutions on Timor in response to what it called Indonesia's military 'intervention'. The first, on 22 December 1975, deplored Indonesia's action, called on it to withdraw and upheld the right of the Timorese people to self-determination. The second, in April 1976 after a visit to Timor by a UN envoy, was essentially the same.



The Security Council asked Portugal, as the governing authority for Timor-Leste, to work with the UN to enable the Timorese people to freely exercise their right to self-determination.



Even though the UN Security Council and General Assembly opposed the Indonesian invasion, some influential members of the UN did nothing in practice to support self-determination in Timor-Leste. For example, France, the UK and USA sold weapons to Indonesia during the Indonesian occupation of Timor. The next Security Council resolution was not until 1999.



The General

Are there other UN bodies besides the Security Council?

Yes there are. For example, the General Assembly. Every year, from 1975 to 1982, the General Assembly adopted a new resolution on the Timor issue. However in 1982, the resolution only passed by 4 votes. That resolution requested the Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, to find a solution. Negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal began in 1983 but without any representatives from the Resistance.

Developments in the 1990s

In 1997, Kofi Annan became the UN Secretary General and began to give more attention to the problem of Timor-Leste.

How?

He established a special team that took a number of initiatives including visiting Timor to talk to the Timorese and facilitating dialogue between different Timorese groups.



As well, don't forget that in 1999 Indonesia's new president, B.J. Habibie, decided that the Timorese people should vote on their future. This opened the way for the UN to speed up its efforts on the Timor issue.

On 2 March 1999, the UN, Indonesia (represented by Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Alatas), and Portugal (represented by Foreign Affairs Minister Jaime Gama), agreed for the UN to hold a Popular Consultation in Timor on 'Two Options'. Indonesia, however, would not accept international peacekeeping forces in Timor-Leste.



On 5 May 1999, Indonesia, Portugal and the UN signed an agreement to implement a Popular Consultation. This agreement stated that:

- Voting would be direct and secret
- The Popular Consultation would be conducted by the UN
- Indonesia would be responsible for security.


Giving Indonesia responsibility for security was strongly criticised at the time. Ian Martin, the head of UNAMET in 1999, later offered the following comment at a CAVR public hearing:

I have reflected a great deal on that. I share the judgement of the negotiators that no amount of pressure on President Habibie in early 1999 could have brought about acceptance of an international peacekeeping force. If so, it was right to take the risk involved in the Agreements, rather than lose the opportunity for self-determination which had been closed for 24 years, and which might not remain open after Habibie.



After being silent on the problems in Timor-Leste since April 1976, the UN Security Council approved the Popular Consultation agreement on 7 May 1999. On 11 June, it established UNAMET and appointed Ian Martin to lead it as Special Representative of the Secretary General.

Critics said that UNAMET was biased in favour of independence and not fair. Regarding this criticism, Ian Martin later said:



UNAMET was committed only to enabling the East Timorese to exercise [their] internationally-recognised right to self-determination...The registration and polling procedures we put in place and operated were highly scrutinised by an Independent Electoral Commission, which held a public hearing of the complaints in the days after the ballot, and by a wide range of international observers. All impartial observers judged the ballot to have been fairly and efficiently conducted, despite difficult conditions and time constraints.


The Popular Consultation was preceded by months of violence on the part of pro-Indonesia militia supported by the Indonesian military. Though the day of the ballot, 30 August 1999, was relatively peaceful, violence erupted again after the result was announced on 4 September.

As most of this violence was directed at pro-independence supporters, Ian Martin later commented:

(The process) was biased against the supporters of independence because the Indonesians failed to fulfil the commitments they had been given. These required that Indonesian government officials should remain neutral, and that East Timorese government officials should campaign only in their personal capacity, without use of public funds or government resources, or "recourse to pressure of office". These requirements were flagrantly violated, despite UNAMET's protests.



Pressure from the international community and from within Indonesia pushed President Habibie to accept a UN peacekeeping force.




The Security Council agreed to send an International Force for East Timor (Interfet) on 20 September 1999.

The Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) acknowledged the results of the Popular Consultation in Timor and annulled the MPR's

On 20 October 1999, the MPR accepted the outcome of the Popular Consultation.




PORTUGAL'S ROLE



The Portuguese dictator Salazar rejected the 1960 UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and refused to decolonise Timor.



Following the 'Carnation Revolution' in 1974, the new Portuguese government accepted the Timorese people's right to self-determination. However, the decision was sudden and took both Portugal and Timor by surprise. Both sides were unprepared and did not have the resources to implement the decision.



Instead of involving the UN, Portugal decided to conduct the process itself, even though it lacked the military resources and budget. In addition to turmoil at home it was also more preoccupied with wars of liberation in its African colonies than with Timor.






The Portugal that was created from the revolution was a weak country, it had no foundations, was facing many difficulties, and had lost all credibility with its former Western allies. This country, preoccupied with its own revolution and trying to gain political stability, didn't treat its African citizens very well ... What did Portuguese people think about Timor in 1974, after the revolution? They didn't, they didn't think about it at all. Their thoughts were preoccupied with the revolution and with their friends in Africa.

(Testimony to CAVR by Major General Mario Lemos Pires, Governor of Portuguese Timor)

For ten years, despite advocacy by Portuguese NGOs and the Timorese resistance, Portugal was largely silent on Timor internationally. When the Socialist Party lead by Mario Soares came to power in 1982, however, political stability increased and Portugal became more active. The Portuguese National Assembly established a Special Committee on Timor and Portugal developed an international strategy on the issue.



zzz



In 1991, Portugal took Australia to the international court in the Hague, accusing it of violating the Timorese people's right to self-determination when it signed the Timor Gap Treaty with Indonesia. Later, Portugal was involved in tri-partite meetings with Indonesia and the UN until the Popular Consultation agreement was signed in 1999.

INDONESIA'S ROLE



How did Indonesia react when it learned that Portugal was active again internationally?

Talking about Indonesia, we need to go back a bit.






Under President Soekarno, Indonesia championed decolonisation everywhere. The Preamble to the 1945 Indonesian Constitution states that independence is the right of every nation. Indonesia formally supported self-determination and all colonised nations and peoples.

In regard to the large island of Borneo...whose northern part is British territory, and likewise as regards one-half of the island of Timor, which is Portuguese, we have no territorial claims at all; because what we consider to be Indonesian and Indonesian territory is nothing else but the entire territory of the former colony: the Netherlands East Indies.

(Mr. Subandrio, Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1961)




Indonesia did not change its position on Timor-Leste when Soeharto became president.



As declared in the 1945 Indonesian Constitution, Indonesia will not take over another territory, so the Timorese people don't need to be afraid ... We guarantee that, regardless of who governs Timor, Indonesia will maintain a positive and friendly relationship and will cooperate in mutually beneficial ways.

(Letter from Foreign Minister Adam Malik to Jose Ramos-Horta, 1974)




If this is true, why did Indonesia invade Timor-Leste?

1974 was a period of considerable change. The war in Vietnam and communist advances in the region strengthened Soeharto's view that self-determination in Timor had to result in integration with Indonesia. Soeharto feared that an independent left-wing Timor would be a threat to Indonesia's unity and stability.



In December 1974, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Adam Malik said that Timor had only two options: "continue under Portugal or integrate with Indonesia". He then ruled out the Portuguese option on the grounds that it would be too big a burden for Portugal and would be "a new form of colonialism". He then ruled out independence claiming the economy and people of Timor were too backward.





After the Carnation Revolution in Portugal, Indonesia expanded its intelligence operation in Portuguese Timor and provided military training to members of Apodeti. Indonesia also used diplomatic means to gain support for integration, including meeting with Portugal, Australia, the US and Timorese leaders. Indonesia began considering a military option at least as early as the beginning of 1975. After cross border activities in October 1975 it launched a full-scale invasion of Timor-Leste on 7 December 1975.

The Indonesian government decided that Timor must become part of Indonesia. It was just a matter of time and a matter of making the decision a reality, however this didn't happen straight away. The Indonesian government tried several things before deciding to use military force. The President said that military action was the last resort.

(Harry Tjan, CSIS adviser to President Soeharto, 1975)



From what you are saying then, no other countries helped us?



Indonesia told the UN that it intervened militarily to uphold the Timorese peoples' right to self-determination. Indonesia said that it provided assistance because several Timorese political parties asked it to help restore peace in the territory.





As well as this, in order to gain international legitimacy for integration, the Soeharto regime organised what it called a process of self-determination in Dili. This small assembly of selected Timorese, called a Popular Representative Assembly, was held on 31 May 1976 and lasted less than an hour. It called for integration with Indonesia.



With few exceptions, the international community did not consider the process complied with UN requirements for a genuine act of self-determination. Due to the heavy and repressive Indonesian military presence, the process was not free; it did not allow for democratic participation, including from the Resistance; and it offered only the option of integration. Despite this, on 17 July 1976, Indonesia made Timor its 27th province. This lasted until a genuine act of self-determination was held on 30 August 1999.

Although the immediate reaction of most countries was to condemn the annexation of East Timor, bit by bit, and fairly fast, within a couple of years most countries were no longer willing to be critical of what was happening in East Timor.

(Francesc Vendrell, UN Senior Staff)



Habibie replaced Soeharto as President of Indonesia and introduced new policies on the Timor issue.






Why do we have this problem when we have a mountain of other problems? Do we get any oil? No. Do we get any gold? No. All we get is rocks. If the East Timorese are ungrateful after what we have done for them, why should we hang on.
(Habibie, after becoming President)

On 27 January 1999, Yunus Yosfiah, Indonesian Minister for Information, announced that Indonesia would consider a 'special status' for Timor:

We will give Special Autonomy status to Timor. If the Timorese people don't accept it, then we will suggest to Parliament that Timor-Leste be released from Indonesia.



That's right. The issue did not only involve Timor, Indonesia and Portugal. It involved all the members of the UN who had to vote on the issue. NGOs in many countries were also concerned about our situation.

Towards the end, then, it seems many people were involved with the Timor issue...



AUSTRALIA'S POSITION ON THE TIMOR ISSUE

Australia is geographically very close to Timor. When Gough Whitlam was leader, Australia paid a lot of attention to its position in Asia and its relationship with Indonesia. Australia did not oppose Indonesia when it invaded Portuguese Timor. Australia's stance was important because many Western governments looked to Australia for guidance on the issue.



I believe that Portuguese Timor should become part of Indonesia. This should happen in accordance with the properly expressed wishes of the people of Portuguese Timor. Portuguese Timor is too small to be independent and is economically unviable. Independence would be unwelcome to Indonesia, to Australia and to other countries in the region, because an independent Portuguese Timor would inevitably become the focus of attention of others outside the region.

(Gough Whitlam, Australian Prime Minister, 1975).


Australia voted for the UN resolution against Indonesia's invasion but in practice supported Indonesia. Its negotiation with Indonesia over borders and natural resources in the Timor Sea soon after the Indonesian invasion signalled that it formally accepted Indonesia's annexation of Timor.



On 11 December 1989, Australia and Indonesia signed the Timor Gap Zone of Cooperation Treaty. Portugal rejected the agreement arguing that it violated the right of the Timorese people to self-determination.


AUSTRALIA - NIAN

Hey! This is where we like to go fishing!



Following President Habibie's offer of autonomy to Timor in June 1998, Australia began negotiating directly with the Timorese people, including Xanana Gusmao. Australia's Prime Minister John Howard, wrote to President Habibie recommending that Indonesia talk directly to the Timorese people to obtain their acceptance of autonomy within Indonesia. Australia wanted Timor to remain part of Indonesia. However the Timorese people chose independence.

Nevertheless, Australia accepted the decision of the Timorese people to be fully independent. When violence broke out after the vote, Australia led the UN-endorsed International Force for East Timor or Interfet to put the UN process back on track and ensure that the decision of the people for independence was respected and implemented.



THE US POSITION ON THE TIMOR ISSUE

The United States of America played a major role in the Timor issue. In principle, the US recognised Portuguese Timor as a non-self-governing territory with the right to self-determination but in practice it actively supported Timor's takeover by Indonesia, including allowing US arms to be used.



One could plausibly see 1975 as the peak of communist power in the world and the perception of threat to the US and what was then called the free world...communist regimes had been installed in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam in March and April 1975, active communist insurgencies still plagued Thailand and Malaysia, and the concept of a monolithic communist threat to South-East Asia and the domino theory remained very much alive. At the same time there was a strong consensus in Washington that the counterweight of an anti-communist Indonesia was vital against the expansion of communism in Asia.

(Testimony to CAVR by Gary Gray, former official in the US State Department)



Meeting between President Ford, US Secretary of State Kissinger, and President Soeharto on 6 December 1975.

We want your understanding if we deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action.

We understand the problem you have and the intentions you have.



The use of US-made weapons could create problems, but it depends on whether it is in self-defence or is a foreign operation. It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly. We would be able to influence the reaction in America if whatever happens happens after we return.



Do you anticipate a long guerrilla war there?




There will probably be a small guerilla war.



A report to the US National Security Council advised that the following US-supplied equipment was used in the invasion:


- Ex-US navyships that shelled the Timor coast on 22 November 1975 and Dili on 7 December 1975.
- 13 planes used in the assault on Dili and Baucau.
- Military equipment such as rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers, mortars, rockets, parachutes and radios used by the 17th and 18th Airborne Brigades when they attacked Dili on 7 December and Baucau on 10 December 1975.
- Radio equipment in the operation control centre in Atambua.



In 1999 the US supported Timor-Leste's self-determination process and pressured Indonesia to accept the international peacekeeping force in Timor.




JAPAN'S POSITION ON THE TIMOR ISSUE




For most of the conflict Japan, a major power, gave strong diplomatic support to Indonesia. It voted against all eight UN General Assembly resolutions on the issue and worked to soften criticism of Indonesia within the UN. Japan denies it gave formal recognition to Indonesia's takeover of Timor but through its official dealings and agreements with Indonesia it effectively acknowledged Indonesia's sovereignty in Timor.

Why did Japan support Indonesia?



Japan and the Soeharto regime had a very close relationship. Japan depended on resources from Indonesia to rebuild its economy after the devastating loss of the Second World War. Indonesia also depended on Japan. By the 1980s Japan was Indonesia's largest investor and aid donor. Japan was also allied with the US.



Terima kasih, senang bekerja sama dengan Anda (Thanks, it's been great working with you).

Arigatou (thank you).



However in 1995, following sustained domestic pressure and developments in Timor, the Murayama government changed Japan's position and contributed financially and diplomatically to the UN's efforts. Japan became a member of a core group of five nations established by UN Secretary General



Japan supported President Habibie's decision to allow a vote on Timor's future and the Popular Consultation. It also urged Indonesia to control the militia and respect the results of the vote. Japan was a principal donor to Interfet and to the humanitarian emergency of 1999 and the reconstruction of Timor.



Hmm, it looks like just about everyone supported Timor's takeover by Indonesia. Wasn't there anyone who supported us?



That's not quite right! Some countries and a growing number of community organisations stuck up for Timor's rights. An influential one of these was the Timorese church. It provided increasing spiritual and cultural protection for the Timorese and spoke out against violations of human rights.



THE VATICAN'S POSITION ON THE TIMOR ISSUE



In 1975, Bishop Ribeiro denounced Fretilin and instructed Catholics not to vote for them. However, he was deeply disturbed by the violence of the invasion and told the Indonesian government: "Your Indonesian troops, with their murders, their violations and pillaging are a thousand times worse" (than Fretilin) and added that "the Indonesian paratroopers descended from heaven like angels but then behaved like devils".



In 1977, the Vatican appointed Dom Martinho da Costa Lopes Apostolic Administrator making him the first Timorese leader of the Catholic Church in Timor. This decision meant that the Vatican took direct control of the local church rather than make it part of the Indonesian church.

This was done because the Vatican believed it could not acknowledge Indonesia's incorporation of Timor until the Timorese had exercised their right of self-determination.




The Vatican was responsible for protecting the local church during the conflict. Vatican officials visited Timor, reported on the situation to Rome and rejected Indonesian pressure to integrate the church. However, it preferred to conduct its diplomacy behind the scenes rather than speak out on the violence and this confounded the Timorese.

Although the Vatican considered Timor to be occupied, it did not advocate this view internationally principally because it felt this would threaten the interests of the Catholic church in Indonesia, some influential members of which supported integration. This ambiguous position created problems for Dom Martinho da Costa Lopes. Initially, he cooperated with Indonesia but as violations continued, he felt obliged to speak out critically. This soured his relationship with both his Vatican superiors and the Indonesian military.

We do not understand why the Indonesian Church and the Universal Roman Church have up till now not stated openly and officially their solidarity with the Church, people and religious of Timor-Leste. Perhaps this has been the heaviest blow for us... We felt stunned by this silence which seemed to allow us to die deserted'.
(Church statement co-signed by Mgr da Costa Lopes, 1981)



The Vatican replaced Dom Martinho with Dom Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo SDB in 1983. Bishop Belo was soon convinced that self-determination was the only solution to the conflict.





In December 1984, Bishop Belo wrote:

Despite all forces against us, we continue to hold and disseminate that (the) only solution to the Timor-Leste conflict is a political and diplomatic one, and this solution should include, above all, respect for the right of a people for self-determination.


Bishop Belo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize with Jose Ramos-Horta in 1996. The prestigious award increased international support for self-determination and contributed to the holding of the 1999 vote.


The Timorese people's struggle ended with the Popular Consultation in August 1999.

We've been talking about the history of the Timorese people's struggle in chronological order. Let's now see in more depth how our people used diplomacy.




THE TIMORESE DIPLOMATIC STRUGGLE







At the start, only Fretilin engaged in international diplomacy.

When some UDT leaders moved overseas after losing the civil war with Fretilin they also became active diplomatically.




The Labour Party was weak while Apodeti and KOTA supported integration.





In the 1980s, UDT increased its international diplomacy and collaboration with other Timorese.



In July 1998, Timor's five political parties joined together to reject autonomy within Indonesia and to call for a referendum.



Fretilin did the most work internationally. Their efforts contributed significantly to the realisation of Timor's right to self-determination.




One of the RDTL's first acts following the Declaration of Independence in November 1975, was to establish an overseas diplomatic front. Three Fretilin leaders were dispatched abroad for this purpose. They were Mari Alkatiri as Minister for Political Relations, Rogerio Lobato as Minister for Defence, and Jose Ramos-Horta as Minister for External Relations and Information. Timor's diplomatic fate may have been very different if these leaders had not been able to leave Timor before the Indonesian military arrived.



They joined three Fretilin representatives who were already overseas: Abilio Araujo, Minister for Economic and Social Affairs, Guilhermina Araujo, Deputy Minister for Economic Relations, and Roque Rodrigues, Ambassador designate to Mozambique.





Fretilin's diplomatic campaign ran into trouble early on. When they arrived at the UN headquarters in New York on 11 December 1975, Abilio Araujo and Jose Ramos-Horta presented themselves as RDTL government ministers but few countries recognised the Declaration of Independence and RDTL. Although not officially abandoned, the policies of 1975 began to fade.



Several weeks after the invasion we had spirited discussions about RDTL. However in 1976-1977, we changed our position and began to think of Timor as a territory that didn't have its own government but did have the right to self-determination. With this position we became stronger.



The Resistance made connections with the international community, beginning with diplomacy in Europe, Africa, America and the UN.




The UN was a key place to conduct the diplomatic resistance because it was responsible for upholding the right to self-determination and had acknowledged Timor had that right.



Jose Ramos-Horta was Fretilin's representative at the UN in New York for 13 years until he resigned from Fretilin in 1998.



At first, most votes cast in the Security Council and General Assembly supported Timor and respected its right to self-determination. Before long, however, this support reduced because many countries decided that the Indonesian occupation of Timor was irreversible.



The UN General Assembly session in 1982 was critical for Timor. Portugal agreed to dialogue about Timor, but Indonesia and Australia tried to remove the issue from the UN's agenda.




Jose Ramos-Horta proposed that the UN refer the Timor problem to the UN Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar (1982-1991). The resolution was carried in the General Assembly by only 4 votes.



Ramos-Horta was 'devastated' by the poor result but referring the issue to the 'good offices' of the UN Secretary-General took it off the GA agenda and left open the hope of a diplomatic solution.



This hope became much stronger in 1990 when support for Timor-Leste strengthened.



Mum, why was the diplomatic struggle successful?

One factor that contributed to the effectiveness of Timor's international diplomacy was the Resistance's ability to adjust and make important changes.



In 1981, for example, Fretilin adjusted to its near annihilation by establishing the Revolutionary Council of National Resistance (Conselho Revolucionario de Resistencia Nacional, CRRN). In 1988 this was changed to the National Council for Maubere Resistance (Concelho Nasional de Resistencia Maubere, CNRM) to represent and include all nationalists.




The establishment of CNRM showed that political ideology had been put to one side and replaced with an inclusive and non-ideological approach.




THE CNRM PEACE PLAN:

1. Establish trust between the Resistance and Indonesia, withdraw military forces and accept UN human rights observers in Timor
2. Total autonomy for 10 years
3. Conduct a referendum to determine Timor's political status.

As you all know, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta in 1996 in recognition of this work. The award was a strong sign of support for Jose Ramos-Horta's diplomatic strategy and the peace plan.



Portugal was also more active internationally. Portugal assisted CNRM to hold a conference in Peniche, Portugal, in 1998.



The convention further strengthened the unity between political parties. Following instructions from Xanana Gusmao, the conference removed the word 'Maubere' from CNRM out of respect for UDT. CNRM became CNRT, the National Council for Timorese Resistance (*Conselho Nacional da Resistencia Timorense*)







In April 1999, CNRT held a planning conference in Melbourne, Australia. This initiative, as well as CNRT's decision to canton Falintil and organise a campaign for independence that avoided provoking the pro-autonomy militia, further strengthened the trust of the international community in the Resistance.

The Resistance gained further legitimacy when the UN decided to use CNRT's name and flag on the voting cards on 30 August 1999.





UNAMET





Do you **ACCEPT** the proposed special autonomy for East Timor within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia?

Apakah anda **MENERIMA** usul otonomi khusus untuk Timor Timur di dalam Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia?

Ita Boot SIMU proposta autonomia espeŝiŝl ba Timor Lorosae iha Estadu Unitáriu Repúblika Indonezia nia laran?

Aceita a autonomia especial proposta para Timor Leste integrada no Estado Unitário da República da Indonésia?



OR ATAU KA OU

Do you **REJECT** the proposed special autonomy for East Timor, leading to East Timor's separation from Indonesia?

Apakah anda **MENOLAK** usul otonomi khusus Timor Timur, yang akan mengakibatkan berpisahanya Timor Timur dari Indonesia?


Ita Boot LA SIMU proposta autonomia espeŝiŝl ba Timor Lorosae, neŝz sei lori Timor Lorosae atu haketak an hosi Indonezia?

Rejeita a autonomia especial proposta para Timor Leste, levando a separaŝo de Timor Leste da Indonésia?


The activities of the Timorese diaspora also helped raise the status of Timor's case. Political leaders welcomed the support of the diaspora.


Oh, so many people from other countries supported our struggle?






CIVIL SOCIETY





Activists did more than support the struggle for independence. They were also active on human rights cases, reuniting families and working with refugees. When the Indonesian military allowed, big agencies like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the US Catholic Relief Services delivered critical aid to victims of the famine. Towards the end of the conflict local NGOs cared for many Timorese displaced by the violence.



Activists from many countries including Indonesia came to Timor-Leste in 1999 to observe the Popular Consultation. Once Interfet had secured the situation following the violence and destruction after the ballot, many community organisations came to Timor to provide aid.




Civil society should take from its Timor-Leste experience that, while it has to be strategic, it is most effective when it (a) sticks to principle, (b) is politically disinterested, (c) is non-violent, (d) is open to everybody's contribution and (e) independent but ready to co-operate with government and business when possible.

In the end,
Timor's road to
self-
determination
was long and
often went round
in circles.




That's right. Timor's struggle was not
simple and involved lots of people in
different roles. It was not fought with
weapons only, but also with words,
advocacy and networking.






CONCLUSION





What did the UN do to prevent the violations by Indonesia?

Even though the UN recognised Timor's right to self-determination, many members of the UN failed to support Timor in and outside the UN. Most Western countries failed to strike the right balance between the principle of self-determination and their strategic and economic interests with Indonesia.



So it would seem that Timor's diplomatic resistance was an important factor in achieving self-determination.

That's right! The Resistance maintained their commitment despite many extraordinary challenges, including internal conflict, limited resources, isolation, and other obstacles both inside and outside Timor Leste.

Another important point is that the diplomacy of the resistance was ultimately successful because it focussed on internationally agreed principles. As it matured, the campaign was based on human rights not ideology and violence and came to accept contributions from all Timorese. It also made maximum use of the international system, the media, and civil society networks. It gained international legitimacy and support at the expense of Indonesia whose case rested on force and had no basis in international law or morality.

Finally, in 1999, the Timorese expressed their right to self-determination through a UN organised referendum. There were two options, autonomy within Indonesia or independence. 78.5% of Timorese chose independence.





